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1 The Problem
The planned Basel Accord for the revision of minimum requirements for banks' risk capital has raised a lot of discussions about how to measure credit risk and forecast probabilities of default (PDs). Within the new revisions, aimed to take effect by the end of 2006, banks are allowed to determine their capital charges due to the inherent credit risk of each borrower. This credit risk, or the probabilities of default respectively, can be inferred to a bank from an internal credit rating model. The planned approach is therefore called the "Internal Ratings Based" approach. A further driver for regulatory capital is the correlation between borrowers. However, this parameter is pre-specified by the supervising authorities. A bank's internal estimates of correlations are not expected to be used for capital charges.
Usually one distinguishes two types of credit rating philosophies, see e.g. Basel Com- philosophy, see Treacy and Carey (2000) . Each philosophy has its own characteristics and purposes. Rating agencies focus on the long term over one or more business cycles.
That is, they provide ratings which are forward-looking and do not try to offer a snapshot of the present situation or the near future, see Standard & Poor's (2002) . A similar interpretation by Moody's can be found in Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2003) . As such, an assigned rating is nearly constant over time (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000a) and is not conditioned on the point of the cycle (Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos, 2003) .
Borrowers are grouped into rating grades which are abbreviated with letters and/or ciphers. For example, S&P use grades from "AAA" ("Highest Rating; The obligor's capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is extremely strong") over "AA", "A", "BBB", and so on, to "C" ("A bankruptcy petition has been filed or similar action has been taken but payments on this obligation are being continued"). Default probabilities are assigned to a grade by calculating the observed default rate of all borrowers within this grade in each year and averaging these figures over a historical horizon (Standard & Poor's, 2001) .
A Point in Time Rating on the other hand reflects a borrower's situation and the most likely future condition over an exactly pre-specified horizon, e.g. one year (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000a). Therefore, the rating changes as soon as the borrower's condition changes within a business cycle and, thus, the ratings are more volatile than the Through the Cycle Ratings (Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos,
2003, see also Carey and Hrycay, 2001). A well-established paradigm of a Point in
Time Rating is the proprietary Merton style model from KMV 1 which makes use of 6 As such, a Point in Time Rating incorporates all relevant information which influences the one-year creditworthiness of a borrower, i.e. the probability that the borrower will default within the next year. Point in Time Ratings and default probabilities are usually derived from market data (e.g. equity returns, credit spreads) as in the KMV model or from statistical models, such as discriminant analysis or logistic regression.
These types of ratings are often used to calculate economic capital.
Within the proposals of the new Basel Accord, there is no explicit guidance on which type of rating philosophy should be employed for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements although the philosophies, or respectively the default probabilities which they generate, are essential for the new capital adequacy framework. Thus, researchers have begun to analyse rating philosophies empirically. Carey and Hrycay (2001) analyse the effects of calibrating external ratings to banks. Crouhy, Galai and Mark (2001) argue that Point in Time Ratings are more appropriate for the purposes of capital allocation. Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson and Tsomocos (2003) suggest that using Through the Cycle Ratings may mitigate the problem of procyclical capital requirements.
To summarize, the delineation above shows that an exact definition of a Point in Time Rating is possible -it reflects a borrower's one-year probability of default -, while a definition of a Through the Cycle Rating is not as clear-cut. Regarding the information content, there is some evidence that Through the Cycle Ratings do not fully reflect all available information, see Altman and Kao (1992) , Lando and Skodeberg (2002) , and the comments in Löffler (2004) .
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In the context of the discussion on rating philosophies, the present paper tries to make several contributions. Firstly, we compare default probability estimates and estimates for asset correlation for Through the Cycle and Point in Time Ratings. Default data from S&P are used and we show that correlations implied by Through the Cycle ratings are merely substitutes for fluctuating underlying default probabilities of the rating grades over time. Using S&P's Through the Cycle Rating as a starting point we generate a "mimicking" Point in Time Rating by adding information about the state of the business cycle. It is shown that asset correlations using this mimicking Point in Time Rating are much smaller than in the Through the Cycle case since one-year default probabilities are reflected more adequately.
Secondly, we analyse which rating philosophy is better in forecasting defaults. We do this by employing the Likelihood Ratio test as it is suggested in Berkowitz (2001) in the context of market risk. Although the test results do not completely answer the question which rating scheme should be favoured, lastly we assess some implications of both types of rating schemes for economic and regulatory capital.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the estimation approach for default probabilities and asset correlations and the backtesting procedure.
Section 3 contains the empirical results of the estimations, the backtesting and the implications for capital requirements. Section 4 concludes. To overcome this problem we use a different approach. Estimates for default probabilities generated from Through the Cycle Ratings are directly calculated by S&P's one year default rates. In order to achieve default probability estimates for Point in Time
Ratings of the same database we "mimic" Point in Time Ratings by including further information about the point of the business cycle into the rating. S&P's ratings are well known to reflect views about borrowers over the whole credit cycle. Thus, by including additional time-dependent information about the actual state of the economy a Point in Time Rating, or its default probability estimates respectively, can be proxied. The procedure used here is similar to the one used by Hamerle, Liebig and Rösch (2003a) , Rösch (2003) , and Hamerle, Liebig and Rösch (2003b) and is described below. increasing default probability from 24% to 12%.
The probability of default at time t for borrower i within a given bucket, given survival 
Model (2) assumes that there is a default threshold which is time invariant and, thus, that there is a default probability which is constant over time. However, if a rating agency attempts to rate through the cycle the actual one year default probability may be different since the information about the current point of the business cycle is intentionally not taken into account. Rather some kind of average default probability over the cycle is reflected.
In order to mimic default probabilities generated by a point in time rating, the default threshold and, thus the default probability, is modeled as a function of the business cycle, for which we use macroeconomic key figures (i.e. risk factors) as proxies. Let ( )
and therefore is assumed to depend on time. In an economic boom the z-factors boost the expected return while it is decreased in a recession. The asset return can then be written as dependent on the observable factors as
β 12 and the default probability conditional on the observable risk factors is given by 
An advantage of models (3) and (5) is that neither need to observe returns on the firms' assets themselves. Instead, a time series of numbers of obligors and observed default events is sufficient for parameter estimation. Suppose for a given segment (for example a rating grade or an industry sector) one observes a time series of defaults t d , and numbers t N of borrowers (t=1,…,T). From the independence of the idiosyncratic shocks it U between obligors it follows that the default events are independent conditional on the realization t f of the common random factor. Thus, the number of defaults is a conditional binomial with parameters t N and default probability ( )
thermore, all random variables are assumed to be serially independent. Then the loglikelihood function for the observed time series is set up by integrating the conditional binomial distribution over the standard normal distributed random effect and summing the logarithms of these unconditional distributions over the T years, i.e. for example for
ϕ denotes the density function of the standard normal distribution. Given the time series of default data the parameters of (3) and (5) can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood (see Gordy and Heitfield, 2000 , Hamerle, Liebig and Rösch, 2003a .
It is important to note that for each of the rating schemes, given estimates for default probabilities and correlations, the default distributions can be forecasted, i.e. the distribution of the potential numbers of defaulting companies for the next period T+1 (e.g. one year) can be calculated as shown in Vasicek (1987) . The probability distribution for the number
of defaulting companies within a risk segment, given the number
of companies in this segment at the beginning of the period is . Furthermore, Vasicek (1991) extends the distribution for the default rate to the limiting case of a portfolio with infinitely many obligors.
Backtesting Credit Risk Models
Many applications in forecasting focus on point forecasting. In the context of financial risk management however, most models generate outputs which cannot be summarized by a single scalar. For example in market risk, one is interested in the whole distribution of potential market values of a portfolio within a pre-specified holding period, e.g. one or ten trading days. Frequently, the information about the whole distribution is condensed into interval forecasts, such as the Value-at-Risk concept, which measures the portfolio loss which will not be exceeded within the holding period with a given probability. Since 1997, these forecasts generated by so-called "internal models" are allowed to be used by banks to determine regulatory capital requirements for market risk. The validity of the forecasts is then assessed by supervisors who compare the model outcomes with actual losses. They follow a simple backtesting rule which is based on the likelihood of occurrences of exceeding the forecasted Value-at-Risk within 250 trading days.
In applying these types of backtesting to credit risk models one faces at least two difficulties. Firstly, historical data of loan performances are typically scarce since the use of credit risk models by banks is a recent innovation. Secondly, in contrast to the changes in value of trading portfolios, defaults on loans are usually observed during longer intervals, e.g. once a year. Thus, focussing on occurrences of exceeding Value-at-Risks of default risky portfolios would require many years of observations.
In order to mitigate these problems, Berkowitz ( In general, the two rating schemes will produce different forecasts for default distributions for two reasons even if the underlying portfolio is the same: The center of the default distribution depends on the predicted default probability and its shape depends on the correlation. The empirical question which should be answered then is: Which distribution is more adequate for forecasting? The backtesting approach works as follows. Suppose we have estimated model (3) and obtained estimates 0 β and b for the relevant parameters 0 β and b . Then, using these estimates we can forecast the probability distribution of potential default for period 1 + T analogously to (6). Denoting the forecast for the conditional probability of default which makes use of the parameter estimates with ( 
To explain the main idea of the backtesting approach, let us assume for a moment that the number of obligors is infinitely large. Then the density of the default rate
the next year is given by the formula derived by Vasicek (1991) or Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998a,b) . Let ( )
denote the forecasted density for the default rate.
Within the next year the companies' default indicators will be observable and at the end of the year we can observe the (ex post) default rate
which serves as a benchmark for backtesting. Then, as Rosenblatt (1952) shows, the transformation is an i.i.d. standard normal variate if the forecasted probability density is correct.
For a sequence of L forecasted distributions and serially uncorrelated ex post observed default rates the transformation (7) can be conducted and a test statistic based on the likelihood ratio under the observations and under the null hypothesis can be calculated 2 refers to the case of a portfolio with infinitely many obligors. In reality, this will not be the case, and the number of obligors will be finite, but sufficiently large. Thus, the above results will hold only approximately. However, Frerichs and Löffler (2003) show that the backtesting approach also works well with a finite though large number of borrowers.
Results
The Data and Estimation Results
We use Standard & Poor's (2001) transition matrices from 1982 to 2000 which are publicly available. Firstly model (3) is estimated for each rating grade. Actually the MLestimates could only be established for the so-called "speculative grades"
• BB ("Obligation faces major ongoing uncertainties or exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions"),
• B ("Adverse conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its financial commitment") and
• CCC ("Currently vulnerable to non-payment") since the numbers of defaults in the upper grades are too small. We estimate a constant default probability over the whole cycle, and an asset correlation which models the fluctuations around this Through the Cycle default probability. As it can be seen, the constant which represents the normalized default threshold increases with decreasing rating grade. Furthermore, the estimate for the asset correlation which is the squared coefficient 2 b is about 5.3% for grade BB, 4.4% for grade B, and 6.6% for grade CCC. These values are much lower than those assumed in the Basel II Accord and their magnitudes correspond to those in Gordy (2000).
In the next step model (5) is estimated with lagged macroeconomic variables as additional risk factors which were provided by the OECD and Deutsche Bundesbank. By adding proxies for the point of the business cycle we try to mimic a Point in Time Rating scheme. Table 2 contains the results of the estimation.
[---Insert Table 2 about here---]
In grades BB and CCC one variable was enough to "explain" the correlation and render the coefficient of the random effect insignificant. In grade BB, an increase of the Federal Funds Rate comes along with an increase of default probabilities in the following year. This is reasonable because higher rates may lead to higher interest rates for debt.
In grade CCC, higher unemployment is associated with decreasing default probabilities in the next year. This is also plausible for two reasons. Firstly, if firms rationalise they release employees. In the following years, their cost pressures decrease leading to lower 20 default risk. Secondly, the government may stimulate the economy by higher public expenditure in times of higher unemployment. This could also decrease default risk. In grade B, although four variables were included, the random effect coefficient is still significantly different from zero but the remaining asset correlation could be reduced to less than 1%.
Backtesting of Forecasted Distributions
So far, we have two rating schemes and try to accomplish a backtesting for the adequacy of the default distribution forecasts they produce. In addition, we compare the ratings to a "naïve" forecast procedure which uses the realized default rate in a given year as forecast for next year's default probability. Since in Basel II the minimum requirements envisage at least five years of historical data we use five years, the period from 1996 to 2000.
For the Through the Cycle Rating we proceed as follows. From the history of defaults until 1995 we estimate default probabilities by averaging the default rates of each rating grade. This average is used as forecast for the default probability of 1996. The asset correlation is determined according to the Basel proposal as of October 2002 depending on the default probability forecast. Then we average default rates until 1996 and use this average as forecast for the default probability of 1997, and so on. These results are then compared to the actual numbers of defaults in the corresponding year which can be extracted from the number of issuers and the default rates in the transition matrices of Standard & Poor's (2001) . In summary we obtain five years of default probability forecasts, asset correlations, issuers in the rating grade and, in addition, realized defaults in the corresponding year. The "naïve" approach works similarly but uses only last year's default rate as forecast instead of the average over the entire history. The results are summarized in Table 3 for the "naïve" alternative and in Table 4 for the Through the Cycle scheme.
[---Insert Tables 3 and 4 
about here---]
In the case of the Point in Time Rating we firstly estimate the models (5) for the rating grades with the data until 1995. Since our macroeconomic factors exhibit time lags of one and two years, we substitute the realized values of 1994 and 1995 into the estimation equation and get forecasts for the default probabilities and the asset correlations due to the model for year 1996. Then the model is estimated with the data until 1996 and the default probabilities and asset correlations are estimated for 1997 the same way. We repeat this proceeding up to the forecasts for year 2000. In summary, we also get five years of model default probability forecasts and model asset correlations which are summarized in Table 5 for each of the three rating grades. Figures 1 to 3 show the actual default rates of the three rating grades and the corresponding default probability estimates due to both rating schemes. As it can be seen, the Point in Time Rating default probabilities seem to result in a more adequate fit to the default rates, in particular for grade B.
[---Insert Table 5 and Exhibits 1 to 3 about here---]
Given these three sets of default probability forecasts, asset correlations and issuers for each grade, distributions of potential defaults can be forecasted according to (6) for each year and rating scheme. Then, using actual defaults the Likelihood Ratios can be computed using the five year history for each rating. Note that the number of issuers in grade CCC is small. The outcomes should thus be treated with some caution. The results of the LR test are summarized in Table 6 .
[---Insert losses is the asset correlation we only alter this parameter. 10,000 simulations are run in each setting. Table 7 summarizes the rejections of the null hypothesis for grade BB with a default probability of 0.01, portfolio sizes of 1,000 and 10,000 and different assumptions about asset correlations.
[---Insert Tables 7 and 8 
Economic and Regulatory Implications
For expository purposes, the distributions of potential default events are forecasted for year 2000, the last year of the backtesting horizon, and are depicted in Figures 4 to 6 for each rating grade and "advanced" rating scheme. The "naïve" alternative is no longer considered due to the rejection of its validity.
[---Insert Exhibits 4 to 6 about here---]
As can be seen from Figures 1 to 3 the year 2000 was a "bad year" with high default rates. Thus, except for grade BB the center of the default distribution due to the Point in Time Rating is shifted to the right compared with the Through the Cycle Rating. Table   9 contains the Expected Losses (EL) under both distributions.
[---Insert Table 9 about here---]
For grade B the Expected Loss is 9.8% versus 5.1%, for grade CCC 33.8% vs. 19.2%.
Only for grade B the Expected Loss is 0.6% versus 1%. However, due to the lower asset correlation the default distributions are in any case narrower under the Point in Time Rating scheme. This can also be seen in Table 9 which exhibits the Value at Risk quantiles of both distribution for each grade. Moreover the Unexpected Losses (UL), defined as the distance of the quantile from the Unexpected Loss, are in any case much smaller than under the Through the Cycle Rating. That is, although 2000 is a bad year and the EL may increase, due to the more exact measurement of one-year risk the uncertainty about the distribution of potential defaults and thus the economic capital decreases, which is needed for buffering unexpected losses.
These findings may also have implications for regulatory capital requirements under the Basel II Accord. Suppose Bank A estimates default probabilities by the Through the Cycle scheme. Then the default probability estimates reflect a long run perspective of the borrowers' conditions and short term fluctuations are captured by the asset correlation. The default probabilities of the rating grades will not substantially change during economic downturns and regulatory capital requirements will be stable through time.
Now consider Bank B which estimates default probabilities by a Point in Time Rating.
In a recession the short term credit qualities -or the one year default probabilities -of most borrowers tend to rise. The higher default probability forecasts will be reflected in a rise of the banks' regulatory capital requirements. This is usually known as the procyclicality effect, see e.g. Allen and Saunders (2002) and the literature overview therein.
Both banks estimate default probabilities of their borrowers via internal models, but only Bank B is penalized since it must hold a higher capital buffer in the recession. The crucial point lies in the separation of default probability estimation and asset correlation under the Basel II Accord. Bank B may exhibit much lower correlations than Bank A. Nevertheless, the presumed asset correlation for capital requirements are the same for both and, thus, the capital requirements for Bank B may oscillate more strongly through 
Conclusion
Some differences between forecasts generated by Through the Cycle and Point in Time
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